Nicomachean Ethics by Aristóteles — Read

Now that we have ascertained what is just and what is unjust, we may say that a man acts unjustly or justly when he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he does not, strictly speaking, act either unjustly or justly, but only "accidentally," i.e. he does a thing which happens to be just or unjust. [127] For whether an act is or is not to be called an act of injustice (or of justice) depends upon whether it is voluntary or involuntary; for if it be voluntary the agent is blamed, and at the same time the act becomes an act of injustice: so something unjust may be done, and yet it may not be an act of injustice, i.e. if this condition of voluntariness be absent.

[127]: Cf. below, "An accidentally unjust act and an accidentally just act are equally possible. ". ↩︎