American Military History, Volume 2 by Richard W. Stewart

Spearheaded by at least three North Vietnamese Army regiments, Communist forces mounted a strong offensive in South Vietnam's Central High- lands during the summer of 1965. Overrunning border camps and besieging some district towns, the enemy seemed poised to cut the nation in two. To meet the danger, Westmoreland proposed to introduce the newly organized Army airmobile di- vision, the 1st Cavalry Division, with its large con- tingent of helicopters, directly into the highlands. Some of his superiors in Hawaii and Washington opposed this plan, preferring to secure coastal bas- es. Though Westmoreland contended that enclave security made poor use of U.S. mobility and of- fensive firepower, he was hard pressed to overcome the fear of an American Dien Bien Phu if a unit in the highlands should be isolated and cut off from the sea.

Despite a sparse population and limited eco- nomic resources, the highlands were strategically important. Around the key highland towns (Kon- tum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, and Da Lat), the South Vietnamese and their advisers had created enclaves. Allied forces protected the few roads that traversed the highlands, screened the border, and reinforced outposts and Montagnard settlements from which the irregulars and Army Special Forces sought to detect enemy cross-border movements and to strengthen tribal resistance to the Communists. Such border posts and tribal camps, rather than major towns, most often were the object of enemy attacks. Combined with road in- terdiction, such attacks enabled the Communists to disperse the limited number of defenders and to discourage the maintenance of outposts.