American Military History, Volume 2 by Richard W. Stewart

Despite the efforts of Pershing and his staff to organize the AEF and develop its strategic designs, as they well knew, in the summer of 1917 the U.S. Army was in no position to make its weight felt. In April 1917 the Regular Army had an aggregate strength of 127,588 officers and men; the National Guard could count another 80,446. Together, the total, lit- tle over 208,000 men, was minute compared to the armies already fight- ing in Europe. The small Army barely had enough artillery and machine guns to support itself, and before the formation of the 1st Division not a single unit of division size existed. Although service in the Philippines and Mexico had given many of the officers and men of the small Regular Army important field skills and experience, it had done little to prepare them for the large-scale planning, maneuvering of divisions and corps, and other logistical and administrative knowledge necessary for this new war. The task of managing the Army's necessary expansion into a large, modern force fell largely to Newton Baker, the Secretary of War.

Secretary Baker seemed out of place heading America's war effort. Small and unassuming, he looked more at home on a university campus than in the War Department. A longtime friend of Woodrow Wilson, Baker had been appointed Secretary of War in the spring of 1916, de- spite his pacifistic attitudes. Although as the mayor of Cleveland he had changed that city's government into an efficient organization, as Secretary of War he would often stay on the moderate, uncontroversial course rather than strike out on a new path. Yet in the bureaucratic chaos that ensued after the United States' entry into the war, Baker proved an unflappable leader who was flexible enough to force change if he had the correct tools.