American Military History, Volume 2 by Richard W. Stewart

Late in December 1941 President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met with their advisers in Washington (the ARCADIA Conference) to establish the bases of coalition strategy and to concert immediate measures to meet the military crisis. They faced an agonizing dilemma. Prompt steps had to be taken to stem the spreading tide of Japanese conquest. On the other hand, it seemed likely that the com- ing year might see the collapse of Soviet resistance and of the British position in the Middle East. In this difficult situation the Allied leaders made a far-reaching decision that shaped the whole course of the war. Reaffirming the principle laid down in Anglo-American staff conversa- tions in Washington ten months earlier, they agreed that the first and main effort must go into defeating Germany, the more formidable en- emy. Japan's turn would come later. Defeating Germany would involve a prolonged process of "closing and tightening the ring" about Fortress Europe. Operations in 1942 would have to be defensive and prepara- tory, though limited offensives might be undertaken if the opportunity presented itself. Not until 1943 at the earliest could the Allies contemplate a return to the European continent "across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe."

GERMANY FIRST At the December 1941 ARCADIA Conference in Washington, Brit- ain and the United States agreed to put the war in the Pacific sec- ond to victory in Europe-even if that meant a U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines and its other possessions in the Pacific. Admiral Har- old R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations in 1940, had argued when contemplating such an eventuality, "If Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere, but … if she loses, the problems confronting us would be very great; … we might, possibly, not win anywhere." This policy was not popular with the many Americans thirsting for revenge against the Japanese for Pearl Harbor, but it was realistic. As U.S. Commander in the Southwest Pacific, General MacArthur would also argue vehemently against the approach; but it remained U.S. policy until Germany surrendered in 1945.