Tyranny and Wisdom coverCHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 4Visible text2 paragraphs
For Hegel, the outcome of the classical "dialectic" of the "dialogue," that is, the victory won in a purely verbal "discussion," is not a sufficient criterion of the truth. In other words, discursive "dialectic" as such cannot, according to him, lead to the definitive solution of a problem (that is to say, a solution that remains unchanging for all time to come), for the simple reason that, if one leaves it at talking, one will never succeed in definitively "eliminating" the contradictor or, consequently, the contradiction itself; for to refute someone is not necessarily to convince him. "Contradiction" or "controversy" (between Man and Nature on the one hand or, on the other hand, between man and man, or even between a man and his social and historical milieu) can be "dialectically done away with" (that is to say, done away with insofar as they are "false," but preserved insofar as they are "true," and raised to a higher level of "discussion") only to the extent that they are played out on the historical plane of active social life where one argues by acts of Work (against Nature) and of Struggle (against men). Admittedly, Truth emerges from this active "dialogue," this historical dialectic, only once it is completed, that is to say once history reaches its final stage in and through the universal and homogeneous State which, since it implies the citizens' "satisfaction," excludes any possibility of negating action, hence of all negation in general, and, hence, of any new "discussion" of what has already been established. But, even without wishing to assume, with the author of the Phenomenology of Mind, that history is already virtually "completed" in our time, one can assert that if the "solution" to a problem has, in fact, been historically or socially "valid" throughout the entire period that has elapsed since, then, short of (historical) proof to the contrary, one has the right to regard it as philosophically "valid," in spite of the philosophers' ongoing "discussion" of the problem. In so regarding it, one may assume that, at the opportune moment, History itself will take care to put an end to the endlessly ongoing "philosophical discussion" of a problem it has virtually "resolved."
Let us therefore see whether understanding our historical past enables us to resolve the problem of the relation between Wisdom and Tyranny, and thus to decide what should be the Philosopher's "reasonable," that is to say "philosophical," conduct with respect to government.

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