
Man is not a real substance but a finite collection of modes contained in God’s attributes of thought and of things. Because man has not existed eternally, is finite, and resembles many other men, he cannot be substance: no real substance begins to exist, produces another substance, or has another like it. Human thought therefore consists of modes of God’s attribute of thought, while human form, motion, and other bodily properties are modes of the other attribute attributed to God. The claim that man is a substance because his nature cannot exist or be understood without the attributes constituting substance rests on a false assumption. The nature of matter or body existed before the particular human body, and therefore cannot belong peculiarly to human nature. Nor is it enough to say that whatever a thing cannot exist or be understood without belongs to its nature, since nothing can exist or be understood without God. Genera likewise do not belong to definitions. What belongs to a thing’s nature must be such that the thing cannot exist or be understood without it, and, conversely, that element cannot exist or be understood without the thing. The inquiry then turns toward the particular modes that constitute man.
By Baruch Spinoza · First published 1660 · Genre: Philosophical Treatise, Metaphysics, Ontology · 600 words
Having, in the first part, discoursed on God, and on the universal and infinite things, we shall proceed now, in the second part, to the treatment of particular and finite things; though not of all, since they are innumerable, but we shall only treat of those which concern man; and, in the first place, we shall consider here what man is, in so far as he consists of certain modes (contained in the two attributes, things and ideas, which we have remarked in God). I say of certain modes, for I by no means think that man, in so far as he consists of spirit, soul, or body, is a real substance. Because, already at the beginning of this book, we proved (1) that no real substance can have a beginning; (2) that one substance cannot produce another; and lastly (3), that there cannot be two like substances.
God and Man is listed on Textopian as an essay by Baruch Spinoza, dated 1660 CE.
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philosophy · metaphysics · ethics · rationalism · pantheism · monism · theology · naturalism · determinism · free will · reason · substance