
Passions arise from opinion, hearsay, and, in some cases, true ideas. Surprise belongs to the first manner of knowledge: a person who forms a general conclusion from only a few particulars is astonished when experience contradicts it. Someone who has known only short-tailed sheep is surprised by long-tailed sheep from Morocco; a peasant who believes no fields exist beyond his own is astonished by the many fields he discovers while seeking a lost cow. Philosophers likewise may suppose there are no worlds beyond their little globe because they have seen none. One who draws true inferences, however, does not feel surprise. Love may arise from opinion, true ideas, or hearsay. Love based on opinion begins when someone sees, or believes he sees, a good and seeks union with it, choosing it as the best thing known. But this love changes as soon as a greater apparent good is discovered. Love founded on true ideas leads to supreme happiness, though it is not considered here. Love from hearsay appears in children who love what their father calls good without further knowledge; it also appears in those who give their lives for the Fatherland or fall in love with something merely through reports about it. Hatred is the opposite of love and springs from the error of opinion. When someone judges a thing to be good and another person harms it, he comes to hate the person responsible. Such hatred would not arise if the true good were known, since everything else, whether existing or imagined, is wretchedness beside it. Those who love what is wretched deserve pity rather than hatred. Hatred may also come entirely from hearsay, as among Moslems, Jews, and Christians who hate one another while remaining ignorant of one another’s religions and morals. Desire, whether understood as the urge to obtain what is lacking or to preserve what one already enjoys, always concerns an apparent good. Like love, it arises from the first kind of knowledge. A sick person desires a remedy after hearing a doctor call it good, and doctors themselves develop desire or confidence in remedies through repeated experience of their effects. The same principles apply to all passions: they may be examined according to whether they are rational or irrational, but the present account concerns passions arising from opinion.
By Baruch Spinoza · First published 1660 · Genre: Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Mind · 1,047 words
Here, then, let us see how, as we have said, the passions derive their origin from opinion. To do this well and intelligently we shall take some special ones, and prove what we say by using these as illustration.
On Passion is listed on Textopian as an essay by Baruch Spinoza, dated 1660 CE.
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philosophy · ethics · metaphysics · rationalism · emotion · reason · human nature · free will · determinism · mind and body · self-knowledge · virtue