On Derision and Jesting

On Derision and Jesting by Baruch Spinoza

Derision and jesting arise from a false opinion and reveal a defect in those who practise them. They wrongly treat the person derided as the independent first cause of his effects, rather than recognizing that these effects necessarily depend on God as all things in Nature do. If the object of derision is not genuinely derisible, the derider displays bad manners; if it does contain an imperfection, the proper response is not mockery but good reasoning intended to remedy the fault. Laughter, unlike derision, concerns not another person but the observer’s recognition of some good in himself. As a kind of Joy, it belongs under the earlier account of Joy. This concerns laughter prompted by an Idea, not laughter produced merely by movements of the vital spirits, which has no relation to good or evil. Envy, Anger, and Indignation are left to the previous discussion of hatred.

By Baruch Spinoza · First published 1660 · Genre: Philosophical Essay, Ethics, Moral Philosophy · 299 words

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Derision and jesting rest on a false opinion, and betray an imperfection in him who derides and jests.

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On Derision and Jesting is listed on Textopian as an essay by Baruch Spinoza, dated 1660 CE.

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philosophy · ethics · humor · ridicule · satire · emotions · reason · morality · social behavior · human nature · rationalism · seventeenth-century

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