On Reason by Baruch Spinoza (1660)
This passage examines why people sometimes fail to do what they recognise as good or to avoid what they recognise as bad, while at other times they possess the power to act accordingly. The explanation lies in the causes of opinions, from which all affects arise: they come either through hearsay or through experience. Reason can destroy opinions acquired only through hearsay, because reason does not itself come from outside in the same manner. It cannot, however, destroy opinions acquired through experience, since the power given by a thing directly experienced is greater than the power obtained indirectly through another thing. The difference is compared to the distinction between reasoning and clear understanding. Understanding proportion itself gives more power than merely understanding the Rule of Three, which depends upon the prior knowledge of proportion. For the same reason, a love can be extinguished by another, greater love. This concerns love arising from true knowledge, not desire, which arises from opinion rather than true knowledge.
By Baruch Spinoza · First published 1660 · Genre: Philosophy, Rationalism, Ethics · 312 words
First lines
At present we have to inquire why it happens that sometimes, although we see that a certain thing is good or bad, we nevertheless do not find in us the power either to do the good or to abstain from the bad, and sometimes, however, we do indeed [find this power in us]. This we can easily understand if we consider the causes that we assigned to opinions, which we stated to be the causes of all affects. These, we then said, [arise] either from hearsay, or from experience. And since all that we find in ourselves has greater power over us than that which comes to us from outside, it certainly follows that Reason can be the cause of the extinction of opinions which we have got from hearsay only (and this is so because reason has not like these come to us from outside), but by no means of those which we have got from experience. For the power which the thing itself gives us is always greater than that which we obtain by way of consequence through a second thing; we noted this difference when speaking of reasoning and of clear understanding, and we did so with the Rule of Three as an illustration. For more power comes to us from the understanding of proportion itself, than from the understanding of the rule of proportion. And it is for this reason that we have said so often that one love may be extinguished by another which is greater, because in saying this we do not, by any means, intend to refer to desire which does not, like love, come from true knowledge, but comes from opinion.
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On Reason is listed on Textopian as an essay by Baruch Spinoza, dated 1660 CE.
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- Work type: Essay
- Author: Baruch Spinoza
- Date: 1660 CE
- Language: English
- Genres: Philosophy, Rationalism, Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
- Length: 312 words
- Structure: 1 section, 1 paragraphs
- Reading fit: Difficult (College Level)
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Genres
- Philosophy — The work is a philosophical inquiry into reason, knowledge, opinion, emotion, desire, and moral action.
- Rationalism — It treats reason as a distinct source of understanding and examines its power to correct beliefs formed through hearsay.
- Ethics — The passage considers why people may know what is good or bad yet fail to act accordingly, directly addressing moral agency and conduct.
- Moral Philosophy — Its central concern is the relation between knowledge of good and evil, human motivation, and the capacity to choose or avoid actions.
Tags
philosophy · rationalism · metaphysics · epistemology · ethics · logic · reason · knowledge · truth · human nature · free will · determinism