
Spinoza defines truth as an affirmation or denial that agrees with the thing concerned, and falsity as one that does not. Though true and false ideas may seem to differ only logically, since both are modes of thought, truth possesses a decisive advantage: the clearest things reveal themselves through themselves. Truth therefore makes both itself and falsity known, whereas falsity cannot disclose itself. A person who has truth cannot genuinely doubt possessing it, while someone in error may believe he has reached truth, as a dreamer may think himself awake but an awake person cannot think himself dreaming. This account also clarifies the claim that God is Truth, or that Truth is God Himself. The greater certainty of a true idea arises because its affirmation or denial agrees fully with the nature of the thing and thus has more essence. Understanding is described as pure passivity: the soul is altered when it receives modes of thought produced by objects acting upon it. When the whole object acts upon someone, that person receives forms of thought corresponding to the object; another person, affected only by fewer or less important attributes, forms a weaker and different judgment. True thought is therefore more perfect, stable, and substantial than false thought. Ideas agreeing with things arise from more causes, possess greater essence, and cannot later be altered, because the essence of a thing is unchangeable. False ideas lack this full agreement, stability, and permanence.
By Baruch Spinoza · First published 1660 · Genre: Philosophy, Epistemology, Metaphysics · 811 words
Let us now examine the true and the false, which indicate to us the fourth, and last, consequence of true belief. Now, in order to do this, we shall first state the definitions of Truth and Falsity. Truth is an affirmation (or a denial) made about a certain thing, which agrees with that same thing; and Falsity is an affirmation (or a denial) about a thing, which does not agree with the thing itself. But this being so, it may appear that there is no difference between the false and the true Idea, or, since the [affirmation or] denial of this or that are mere modes of thought, and [the true and the false Idea] differ in no other way except that the one agrees with the thing, and the other does not, that they are therefore, not really, but only logically different; and if this should be so, one may justly ask, what advantage has the one from his Truth, and what harm does the other incur through his falsity? and how shall the one know that his conception or Idea agrees with the thing more than the other does? lastly, whence does it come that the one errs, and the other does not?
On the True and the False is listed on Textopian as an essay by Baruch Spinoza, dated 1660 CE.
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philosophy · epistemology · metaphysics · rationalism · truth · falsehood · knowledge · reason · ideas · logic · ethics · early modern philosophy