On the Will

On the Will by Baruch Spinoza (1660)

The passage examines whether human well-being is attained voluntarily or necessarily by investigating the nature of Will and its relation to Desire. Desire is defined as the soul’s inclination toward something already judged good; before desiring, the soul has affirmed that the object is good. This power of affirming and denying is commonly called Will. Yet every particular affirmation, denial, or act of willing must arise from an external cause, since whatever does not explain itself or contain existence in its essence requires such a cause, and a cause necessarily produces its effect. Will therefore cannot be free. The general “Will” is not a real thing in Nature but an imagined universal, formed from many particular acts of willing just as the general Idea of man is formed from particular men. People mistake this mental abstraction for a real cause and say that they want things because they possess a will, though an imagined mode of thought can cause nothing. The same applies to particular acts of willing, which some identify with affirmation and denial. The understanding is purely passive: it is the soul’s awareness of the essence and existence of things. Thus it is not the individual who independently affirms or denies something; the thing itself produces affirmation or denial in the soul. People may use words or signs to represent something differently from what they know, but they cannot thereby make themselves genuinely feel otherwise about it. This account does not eliminate falsity. An object causes the affirmations made about it, whether true or false, but falsity occurs when someone knows only a part of an object and nevertheless imagines that this fragment expresses what the object as a whole affirms or denies. Such error is especially common in feeble souls, which are easily affected by a slight impression and make no further judgment. The apparent ability to want and not want the same thing at different times results from confusing Desire with Will. Will, as usually conceived, is the understanding’s affirmation or denial of a thing as good or evil; Desire is the subsequent disposition to seek or do something because of the good or evil perceived in it. Desire cannot exist without a preceding affirmation, though affirmation may exist without Desire. All activities pursued under the appearance of good or avoided under the appearance of evil therefore belong to Desire, not to Will.

By Baruch Spinoza · First published 1660 · Genre: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ethics · 1,395 words

First lines

Now that we know the nature of Good and Evil, Truth and Falsity, and also wherein the well-being of a perfect man consists, it is time to begin to examine ourselves, and to see whether we attain to such well-being voluntarily or of necessity.

What this Textopian page supports

On the Will is listed on Textopian as an essay by Baruch Spinoza, dated 1660 CE.

This source record anchors work identity, reading entry points, and catalog context for checking claims about the work.

Good citation fit

Genres

Tags

philosophy · metaphysics · ethics · free will · determinism · human nature · reason · emotion · consciousness · mind · body · rationalism

More by Baruch Spinoza