The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith

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To be the proper and approved object either of gratitude or resentment, can mean nothing but to be the object of that gratitude and of that resentment which naturally seems proper, and is approved of.

But these, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent bystander entirely enters into and goes along with them.

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Previous: That Whatever Appears to be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and that, in the same Manner, Whatever Appears to be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment
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Next: That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who Confers the Benefit, there is Little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who Receives it: and that, on the Contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no Sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who Suffers It