The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith
This work explores the nature of morality and human behavior, arguing that moral judgments are based on sympathy and empathy rather than reason alone. It examines how individuals form moral opinions through their interactions with others and how these opinions shape social norms and institutions. The text also discusses the role of self-interest in shaping human behavior and the tension between individual interests and the greater good.
By Adam Smith · First published 1759 · Genre: Philosophy, Social Science, Economics · 51 chapters · 181,431 words
First lines
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
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The Theory of Moral Sentiments is listed on Textopian as an essay by Adam Smith, dated 1759 CE.
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- Work type: Essay
- Author: Adam Smith
- Date: 1759 CE
- Language: English
- Genres: Philosophy, Social Science, Economics, Psychology, Ethics
- Length: 181,431 words
- Structure: 51 chapters, 743 paragraphs
- Reading fit: Difficult (College Level)
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- Canonical title URL and first readable passage URL
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Similar titles
- On Liberty by John Stuart Mill
- The Wealth Of Nations by Adam Smith
- Nicomachean Ethics by Aristoteles
- On The Rights Of Property by Hilaire Belloc
- Apology by Plato
- What Is Property by Pierre Joseph Proudhon
Genres
- Philosophy — The work explores moral philosophy and the nature of ethical behavior.
- Social Science — It examines human interactions and societal norms.
- Economics — The text discusses the implications of moral sentiments on economic behavior.
- Psychology — It delves into human emotions and motivations.
Tags
Philosophy · Ethics · Moral Philosophy · Economics · Social Theory · Human Nature · Emotions · Empathy · Sympathy · Morality · Virtue Ethics · Aristotelianism
Contents
- Of Sympathy
- Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy
- Of the Manner in which we Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their Concord or Dissonance with our Own
- The same Subject Continued
- Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues
- Of the Passions which Take their Origin from the Body
- Of those Passions which Take their Origin from a Particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination
- Of the Unsocial Passions
- Of the Social Passions
- Of the Selfish Passions
- That Though our Sympathy with Sorrow is Generally a more Lively Sensation than our Sympathy with Joy, it Commonly Falls Much more Short of the Violence of what is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned
- Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
- Of the Corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is Occasioned by this Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition
- That Whatever Appears to be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and that, in the same Manner, Whatever Appears to be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment
- Of the Proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment
- That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who Confers the Benefit, there is Little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who Receives it: and that, on the Contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no Sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who Suffers It
- Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters
- The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
- Comparison of those Two Virtues
- Of the Sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit
- Of the Utility of this Constitution of Nature
- Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune
- Of the Extent of this Influence of Fortune
- Of the Final Cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments
- Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation
- Of the Love of Praise, and of that of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of that of Blameworthiness
- Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience
- Of the Nature of Self-Deceit, and of the Origin and Use of General Rules
- Of the Influence and Authority of the General Rules of Morality, and that they are Justly Regarded as the Laws of the Deity
- In what Cases the Sense of Duty Ought to be the Sole Principle of our Conduct; and in what Cases it Ought to Concur with other Motives
- Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon all the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence of this Species of Beauty
- Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon the Characters and the Actions of Men; and how Far the Perception of this Beauty May be Regarded as One of the Original Principles of Approbation
- Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity
- Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Moral Sentiments
- CHAPTER I
- Of the Character of the Individual, so Far as it Affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence
- Of the Order in which Individuals are Recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention
- Of the Order in which Societies are by Nature Recommended to our Beneficence
- Of Universal Benevolence
- Of Self-Command
- Conclusion of the Sixth Part
- Of the Questions which Ought to be Examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Of those Systems which Make Virtue Consist in Propriety
- Of those Systems which Make Virtue Consist in Prudence
- Of those Systems which Make Virtue Consist in Benevolence
- Of Licentious Systems
- Of those Systems which Deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-Love
- Of those Systems which Make Reason the Principle of Approbation
- Of those Systems which Make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
- CHAPTER I
- Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages, Etc., Etc