
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
This work explores the nature of morality and human behavior, arguing that moral judgments are based on sympathy and empathy rather than reason alone. It examines how individuals form moral opinions through their interactions with others and how these opinions shape social norms and institutions. The text also discusses the role of self-interest in shaping human behavior and the tension between individual interests and the greater good.
By Adam Smith · First published 1759 · Genre: Philosophy, Social Science, Economics · 51 chapters
Contents
- Of the Character of the Individual, so Far as it Affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence
- Of Sympathy
- Of the Passions which Take their Origin from the Body
- That Though our Sympathy with Sorrow is Generally a more Lively Sensation than our Sympathy with Joy, it Commonly Falls Much more Short of the Violence of what is Naturally Felt by the Person Principally Concerned
- That Whatever Appears to be the Proper Object of Gratitude, Appears to Deserve Reward; and that, in the same Manner, Whatever Appears to be the Proper Object of Resentment, Appears to Deserve Punishment
- Comparison of those Two Virtues
- Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune
- Of the Principle of Self-Approbation and of Self-Disapprobation
- Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon all the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence of this Species of Beauty
- Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity
- CHAPTER I
- Of the Order in which Individuals are Recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention
- Of Self-Command
- Of the Questions which Ought to be Examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments
- Of those Systems which Make Virtue Consist in Propriety
- Of those Systems which Deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-Love
- CHAPTER I
- Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy
- Of those Passions which Take their Origin from a Particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination
- Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks
- Of the Proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment
- Of the Sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit
- Of the Extent of this Influence of Fortune
- Of the Love of Praise, and of that of Praiseworthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of that of Blameworthiness
- Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility Bestows Upon the Characters and the Actions of Men; and how Far the Perception of this Beauty May be Regarded as One of the Original Principles of Approbation
- Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon Moral Sentiments
- Of the Order in which Societies are by Nature Recommended to our Beneficence
- Of those Systems which Make Virtue Consist in Prudence
- Of those Systems which Make Reason the Principle of Approbation
- Of the Manner in which we Judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their Concord or Dissonance with our Own
- Of the Unsocial Passions
- Of the Corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is Occasioned by this Disposition to Admire the Rich and the Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition
- That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who Confers the Benefit, there is Little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who Receives it: and that, on the Contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no Sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who Suffers It
- Of the Utility of this Constitution of Nature
- Of the Final Cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments
- Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience
- Of Universal Benevolence
- Of those Systems which Make Virtue Consist in Benevolence
- Of those Systems which Make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
- The same Subject Continued
- Of the Social Passions
- Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters
- Of the Nature of Self-Deceit, and of the Origin and Use of General Rules
- Conclusion of the Sixth Part
- Of Licentious Systems
- Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages, Etc., Etc
- Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues
- Of the Selfish Passions
- The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
- Of the Influence and Authority of the General Rules of Morality, and that they are Justly Regarded as the Laws of the Deity
- In what Cases the Sense of Duty Ought to be the Sole Principle of our Conduct; and in what Cases it Ought to Concur with other Motives
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