
The text critiques the notion of maximizing happiness for the greatest number, questioning the definition of happiness itself. It argues that happiness is subjective and varies among individuals, making a universal standard problematic. The author highlights the absurdity of equating happiness with mere pleasure, using the example of a savage who finds happiness in violence, illustrating that different people have different conceptions of what constitutes happiness. The work emphasizes the necessity of a rational and moral framework to guide actions aimed at promoting the happiness of others. It asserts that good intentions must align with a common understanding of what is beneficial for all, rather than being dictated by individual preferences. The author challenges the idea that actions can be morally justified solely by the pleasure they bring to the actor, arguing that true moral actions should be based on a sense of duty and reason. The text further critiques the reduction of moral actions to mere self-interest, suggesting that if conscience is treated as a means to achieve pleasure, it undermines the integrity of moral decision-making. The author insists that genuine moral actions arise from a commitment to the well-being of others, grounded in a shared understanding of good, rather than personal gratification. Ultimately, the work calls for a deeper exploration of the principles that govern moral actions and the definitions of happiness, advocating for a more nuanced approach that recognizes the complexity of human desires and the importance of ethical reasoning in the pursuit of collective well-being.
By Samuel Taylor Coleridge · First published 1825 · Genre: Philosophical Essay, Social Critique, Political Philosophy · 638 words
O. P. Q. in the Morning Chronicle is a clever fellow. He is for the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number, and for the longest possible time! So am I; so are you, and every one of us, I will venture to say, round the tea-table. First, however, what does O. P. Q. mean by the word _happiness_? and, secondly, how does he propose to make other persons agree in _his_ definition of the term? Don't you see the ridiculous absurdity of setting up _that_ as a principle or motive of action, which is, in fact, a necessary and essential instinct of our very nature -- an inborn and inextinguishable desire? How can creatures susceptible of pleasure and pain do otherwise than desire happiness? But, _what_ happiness? That is the question. The American savage, in scalping his fallen enemy, pursues _his_ happiness naturally and adequately. A Chickasaw, or Pawnee Bentham, or O. P. Q., would necessarily hope for the most frequent opportunities possible of scalping the greatest possible number of savages, for the longest possible time. There is no escaping this absurdity, unless you come back to a standard of reason and duty, imperative upon our merely pleasurable sensations. Oh! but, says O. P. Q., I am for the happiness of _others! _ Of others! Are you, indeed? Well, I happen to be one of those _others_, and, so far as I can judge from what you show me of your habits and views, I would rather be excused from your banquet of happiness. _Your_ mode of happiness would make _me_ miserable. To go about doing as much _good_ as possible to as many men as possible, is, indeed, an excellent object for a man to propose to himself; but then, in order that you may not sacrifice the real good and happiness of others to your particular views, which may be quite different from your neighbour's, you must do _that_ good to others which the reason, common to all, pronounces to be good for all. In this sense your fine maxim is so very true as to be a mere truism.
Greatest Happiness Principle is listed on Textopian as an essay by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, dated 1825 CE.
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philosophy · ethics · utilitarianism · happiness · morality · human nature · well-being · pleasure · consequentialism · social justice · individual rights · moral philosophy